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621 
GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
PATRICIA M. WALD∗ 
I. CURRENT TENSIONS 
There are currently some troublesome issues about the overlaps and 
gaps between crimes against humanity and genocide as defined and 
enforced by international, hybrid and national courts. 
Up front, of course, we must always keep in mind that the origin of 
international humanitarian law crimes is different from national crimes. 
International crimes derive mainly from international customary law and 
sometimes treaties. Not all treaties, however, qualify as expressions of 
customary law—especially if they have not been adopted or adhered to by 
a majority of civilized nations and not all customary law is incorporated in 
treaties.1 So, for instance, like Topsy in Uncle Tom’s Cabin, international 
crimes against humanity have ‘Just growed.” Genocide, however, 
encapsuled in the Genocide Convention of 1948,2 and excruciatingly 
slowly ratified over the next 50 years, has remained textually static though 
interpretatively somewhat fluid. Unlike national criminal codes, 
international crimes do not lend themselves so easily to periodic 
reexamination and codification under the goal of establishing an integrated 
body of law. The several international and hybrid courts established over 
the past two decades have been the primary interpreters and enforcers of 
international criminal law, and I would add the prosecutors in those courts 
(perhaps to an even greater extent than the judges) have been the primary 
actors in that process. The drafters of the Rome Statute3 and its Elements 
of Crime produced a written document in 2000 which incorporates the best 
of the ad hoc courts’ interpretations of these two international crimes (but 
only up to that point in time) and there is a useful document attempting to 
set out principles of international customary law issued by the ICRC in 
2005.4 Customary law, however, keeps evolving largely through the 
 
 
 ∗ Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (ret.); Judge, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1999–2001).  
 1. See, e.g., George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 541 (2005). 
 2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
 4. See W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law Study: A Preliminary Assessment, 99 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 208 (2005). 
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courts. Because the Rome drafters purported to keep within the bounds of 
customary law in defining the Elements of Crime, they did not try to do 
serious redrafting of the scope of the different categories of international 
crimes to avoid overlap or gaps. Unless and until an international 
convention on crimes against humanity reviews the state of the art and 
comes up with recommendations on the scope and definition of that crime, 
its evolutionary development will almost surely continue in its current 
judicial mode. Similarly, the definition of genocide in the Genocide 
Convention, repeated verbatim in the Charters of the international courts, 
and now recognized as customary law but which is, incidentally, the cause 
of some concern about its adaptability to post-World War II mass 
atrocities, is not likely to be altered, because there is fear that if the issue 
of its scope were opened and proposed amendments entertained either the 
core itself might be endangered, or it might result in a runaway expansion 
so as to make it indistinguishable from its country cousin, crimes against 
humanity. As a result some tension surfaces in international courts about 
the dividing line between crimes against humanity and genocide. 
II. ORIGINS 
Given the focus of this Conference on the Nuremberg Tribunal, a word 
about when and how the two categories of international crimes came into 
being. The Nuremberg Tribunal, of course, featured the first appearance 
on the international court scene of crimes against humanity—a category 
that was designed to cover the Nazi atrocities perpetrated by the German 
government on its own citizens—Jews and other disfavored groups as well 
as crimes inflicted on the peoples of occupied countries. Some historians 
argue that its recognition in the Nuremberg Judgment as a crime under 
customary law was distinctly “problematic.”5 In part, reacting to concerns 
of the Nuremberg Charter drafters that there was not a basis in customary 
law for setting up this new category,6 Chief Nuremberg Prosecutor Justice 
Robert H. Jackson insisted that such internal crimes must be tied to other 
more traditional war crimes or to the newly-minted crime of aggressive 
war itself.7 Thus only the Holocaust-related crimes committed after 
 
 
 5. GUENAEL METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS 16 (2005). 
 6. According to Telford Taylor, Jackson’s successor Chief Prosecutor, the French and Russians 
saw “little to distinguish crimes so charged from those already dealt with as crimes against military 
and civilian victims.” TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 317, 294 
(1992). 
 7. Article 6(c) of the IMT (International Military Tribunal) Charter limited crimes against 
humanity, defined to include extermination, enslavement, deportation and subjection to inhumane 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/13
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September 1, 1939, when World War II officially began were allowed to 
be prosecuted. There was, however, much evidence of earlier crimes 
against humanity allowed into evidence as background for these later 
prosecutable crimes. And indeed the link between crimes against humanity 
and war continued through to the enabling Charter of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (though not the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) nor the Rome 
Statute), although the ICTY link was interpreted to require only proof of 
the existence of an armed conflict when a crime against humanity was 
committed, not a nexus between them as in the case of war crimes. In 
Nuremberg what would now constitute genocide was then prosecuted as a 
crime against humanity.8 After World War II, through the relentless efforts 
of Ralph Lemkin, the concept of genocide as a separate international crime 
emerged. The Genocide Convention of 1948 defined that new crime as 
requiring “an intent to destroy in whole or in part a religious, racial, 
national or ethnic[al] group as such” and the commission of at least one of 
five designated crimes to accomplish that purpose,9 but dropping 
altogether any nexus with war. The precision of the Convention’s 
definitional requirements engendered much debate during the drafting of 
the Convention itself and subsequent ratifications by States.10 (The U.S. 
only ratified, with reservations, in 1986.) It survives basically intact in all 
of the charters of the international and hybrid courts, though modified in 
some minor respects in the Rome Statute and its Elements of Crime. 
The textual differences between the two crimes11—crimes against 
humanity and genocide—are the following: Crimes against humanity 
require that the acts prosecuted be part of a systematic or widespread 
attack against a civilian population (and the perpetrator know about the 
wider campaign). Genocide requires that the acts (which can only be the 
specific five listed) be committed against a racial, religious, national or 
ethnic group and be done with the specific intent of destroying the group 
in whole or in part ‘‘as such.” The genocidal acts themselves might be 
 
 
conditions, to those “in execution of a crime in connection with any crime under the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal.” Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. 
 8. The term “genocide,” defined as “the extermination of social and national groups . . . 
particularly Jews and Poles and Cyprians and others” was used in the charging points of the 
indictment. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 103. 
 9. The five genocidal acts are: killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately 
inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, imposing measures designed 
to prevent births, and finally transferring children from a protected group to another group. 
 10. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 2 (2000). 
 11. The differences here set out are taken from the Charter of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). S.C. Res. 827, arts. 4–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,1993). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 621 Wald book pages.doc10/29/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
624 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6:621 
 
 
 
 
committed against only a few persons and do not have to be part of a 
widespread or systematic campaign against civilians,12 though the Rome 
Statute in its Elements of Crime Addendum now requires that “the conduct 
took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed 
against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such 
destruction.”13 The tightly restricted definition in the Genocide 
Convention of “destroy” to rule out all but the physical or biological 
destruction of the group—cultural destruction is not enough—and the 
exclusion of targeted groups such as women, economic or social classes or 
political groups have evoked frustration on the part of many human rights 
groups. They are not entirely mollified by the fact that victims in the latter 
groups can be vindicated through prosecution of crimes against humanity. 
Other commentators, however, are grateful that genocide, which in the 
popular mind is the worst of all crimes, is definitively so limited and does 
not thereby lose its deterrent currency through too expansive application to 
every kind of massacre.14 
Still it must not be forgotten that crimes against humanity were 
originally conceptualized as acts of so odious a nature that their 
commission was not just an assault on the victims involved, as with war 
crimes, but an offense against all humanity. Thus Hannah Arendt 
described the Holocaust as “a crime against humanity perpetrated upon the 
body of the Jewish people.”15 And the Yugoslav Tribunal in its first 
judgment opined that “Crimes against humanity are crimes of a special 
nature to which a greater degree of moral turpitude attaches than to an 
ordinary crime.”16 Indeed, in another early case the Appeals Chamber 
overturned the guilty plea of a foot soldier to crimes against humanity 
because he had not been adequately informed of the difference between 
pleading to a war crime and pleading to a crime against humanity, despite 
there being no difference in the penalty the court could impose for the two 
crimes.17 “Because of their heinousness and magnitude they (crimes 
against humanity) constitute an egregious attack on human dignity, on the 
very notion of humaneness,” the court wrote. As a jus cogens crime, 
crimes against humanity carry an obligation under international law on the 
part of States to prosecute or extradite perpetrators found within their 
 
 
 12. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment (July 5, 2001). 
 13. Elements of Crime, art. 6. 
 14. SCHABAS, supra note 10, at 8–13. 
 15. Barry Gewen, The Everyman of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, at 10 (reviewing 
David Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann). 
 16. Prosecutor v. Duko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, para. 271 (July 15, 1999). 
 17. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A Judgment (Oct. 7, 1997). 
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borders regardless of where the crime was committed or who the 
immediate victims were.18 
The expansion of the list of recognized crimes against humanity law 
since Nuremberg—all adopted through court interpretation of customary 
law—is noteworthy. Prosecutions under Control Council #10, following 
the principal Nuremberg prosecution, included rape as a crime against 
humanity in its own right. Nuremberg had prosecuted it only under the 
rubric of outrages against dignity. The most recent list of crimes against 
humanity in the Rome Statute includes murder, extermination, deportation 
(all derived from Nuremberg), but also forcible transfer of population 
(internal to a country), imprisonment, torture, rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, persecution against any 
identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender or other grounds universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in the same 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the court; enforced 
disappearance of persons or the crime of apartheid, also other inhumane 
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or mental health. Some commentators say that the Rome 
Statute went beyond customary law in recognizing in the crime of 
persecution discrimination against cultural and gender groups but cut back 
on customary law in requiring for persecution that the discrimination be in 
connection with another crime in the court’s jurisdiction.19 In any case, 
crimes against humanity is a big tent set up on ground that overlaps both 
war crimes and genocide. According to William Fenrick, one of the 
original and still active prosecutors at the ad hoc tribunals: “Just as 
genocide has become the offense which represents what happened in 
Germany during 1944, so the crime against humanity of persecution has 
come to typify what happened in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.”20 
Because of its breadth of coverage, crimes against humanity had become 
the growth stock of Tribunal jurisprudence. Except for the ICTY, crimes 
 
 
 18. M. Charif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: 
Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 201–02 (1998). 
 19. LEILA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (2001). 
 20. William J. Fenrick, The Crime Against Humanity of Persecution in the Jurisprudence of the 
ICTY, in 32 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2001 89 (2002). Typical of ICTY 
indictments of high-level officials for ethnic cleansing are charges that the accused participated in a 
joint criminal enterprise whose purpose was the permanent forcible removal of Bosnian Muslim and 
Bosnian Croat inhabitants from the territory of the planned Serbian state, including a campaign of 
persecution through the commission of the crimes alleged in the indictment. Id. 
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against humanity no longer requires any nexus with armed conflict, it 
encompasses discriminatory acts against a much wider range of groups 
than genocide, and many more kinds of acts than the five listed in the 
Genocide Convention and charters, and it carries with it still a heavier 
component of international shame than war crimes.21 
III. THE PRACTICE 
But are there drawbacks to the overlap and gaps between the three 
types of crimes? Do the current technical requirements for each make 
sense so far as their original concepts and continuing functionality are 
concerned? And are they relevant so far as the way armies, paramilitaries 
and terrorists operate in the real world? Before looking for answers let me 
reiterate that within evidentiary restraints the choice between genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes will initially and often ultimately 
be the prosecutors’ in the charging instrument. This choice I might add 
does not always sit well with the judges; for instance, at the ICTY the 
prosecutors brought genocide charges against a single camp commandant 
against whom there was ample evidence of his hatred of and intent to 
destroy Bosnian Muslims. He likened himself to Adolph Hitler and 
repeatedly swore his intention to kill or reduce to slavery all Bosnian 
Muslims. Indeed he pleaded guilty to several counts of crimes against 
humanity involving personal killings and torture of camp inmates. There 
was, however, no evidence that he was acting pursuant to any broader plan 
of the Bosnia Serb military or civilian authorities to engage in an 
organized slaughter of Muslims. The trial court sua sponte dismissed the 
genocide charge but the Appeals Chamber ruled that although the 
prosecutor had made out a prima facie case of genocide, it would not 
remand for a trial since the defendant’s punishment for the other non 
genocidal crimes to which he had pled was sufficient. They did so over 
two dissents (mine was one) and the somewhat dubious authority of court-
made Rule 117, which, according to the majority, gave the Appeals 
Chamber discretion whether to remand for retrial in the event of a serious 
error by the Trial Chamber. Though not explicitly articulated as a reason 
for not letting the genocide trial go forward, there was speculation that the 
majority simply did not think the first genocide trial at the ICTY should 
involve a loner zealot regardless of the fact that the definition of genocide 
 
 
 21. But see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 69 (Jan. 26, 2000) 
(There is “in law no distinction between the seriousness of a crime against humanity and that of a war 
crime.”). 
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permitted a single defendant to be convicted of genocide, absent the 
backup of a wider plan.22 Note that the ICC Elements of Crime add an 
additional requirement that the genocidal acts be committed in the context 
of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against the group or 
conduct that can itself effect such destruction [of the group in whole or in 
part as such]. But despite such setbacks, in the prosecutor’s world, 
genocide can and is used as a bargaining chip because of its super-stigma; 
it can be negotiated down to crimes against humanity in exchange for a 
guilty plea and the accuseds’ help in prosecuting others. 
Because of the peculiarities of definition, some of the worst crimes in 
history may not be brought as genocides but only as crimes against 
humanity. This may well turn out to be the case in Cambodia where mass 
atrocities against millions of city dwellers and upper social class 
Cambodians were committed during the Khmer Rouge regime. There is 
widespread agreement among commentators that such groups do not 
qualify for genocide treatment as “racial, religious, national or ethnical.”23 
Similarly, the alleged Darfur atrocities in the Sudan—purposeful killings, 
rapes and relegation of villagers to a way of life almost certain to destroy 
them have been labeled by an expert UN Commission of Inquiry as likely 
crimes against humanity rather than genocide. These experts were not 
convinced that the special genocidal intent of destruction of a group as 
such could be shown as opposed to a relentless and barbarous campaign to 
ferret out rebels hidden among the villagers.24 
One of the most controversial genocide/crime against humanity 
disputes has occurred over whether and when the ethnic cleansing 
campaign of Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic in the former Yugoslavia 
spilled over into genocide. Slobodan Milosevic, the former President of 
Yugoslavia was in the midst of trial for genocide and crimes against 
humanity and war crimes when he died; Radovan Karadzic, the former 
President of the Autonomous Serb Republic, and Radko Mladic, the 
Bosnian Serb military leader have been indicted but not yet apprehended 
for genocide. In the meantime, General Radoslav Krstic, the head of the 
Drina Corp of Bosnian Serbs, on whose territory the infamous Srebrenica 
massacres were conducted, was found guilty of aiding and abetting 
genocide (as a perpetrator by the Trial Chamber, reduced to aiding and 
 
 
 22. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, supra note 12, ¶¶ 73–77. 
 23. See Patricia M. Wald, Judging Genocide, JUSTICE INITIATIVES (A publication of the Open 
Society Justice Initiative, Spring 2006), April 2006, at 85. 
 24. See William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission 
of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1703 (2006). 
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abetting by the Appeals Chamber), others serving under Mladic are 
currently being tried for both crimes on the basis of the same Srebrenica 
incident.25 Still others have been acquitted of genocide on the basis of 
other ethnic cleansing incidents due to insufficient showing of intent to 
destroy a group, ‘‘as such.”26 The trial court in Krstic decided and the 
Appeals Chamber affirmed that there had been a planned campaign 
spearheaded by Mladic to capture, execute and secretly mass bury between 
7,000-8,000 young Bosnian Muslim men attempting to escape from 
Srebrenica—a UN safe enclave—after its capture by the Serbs in the 
summer of 1995.27 Still, however, there are respected commentators who 
did not think it a true genocide but only an extreme example of ethnic 
cleansing since the massacres involved only the male population of one 
town, not enough in their view to meet the criteria of intent to destroy an 
ethnic or religious group as such.28 Still it is one of only two genocide 
convictions handed down by the ICTY in over a decade. The International 
Court of Justice in the Hague had under consideration for 13 years a case 
filed by the State of Bosnia against the then-State of Yugoslavia for 
genocide based on a wider theory than the Srebrenica incident: its judges 
from 16 countries held 9 weeks of hearings on the case. Last year the 
Court found no wider genocide than Srebrenica and even there no Serbian 
responsibility except a limited one in failing to prevent Srebranica. Had 
the ICJ found in favor of a wider traceable to Serbia it is reported “hefty 
war reparations” might have been claimed for the 100,000 Bosnians killed 
and the innumerable villages destroyed. And since it was a civil action the 
levels of proof did not need to be as high as in the criminal prosecutions of 
individuals in the ad hoc tribunals.29 
 
 
 25. For details on those prosecutions, see ICTY website: http://www.un.org/icty. 
 26. See Emma Thomasson, Bosnian Serb Given 27 years for War Crimes, Cleared of Genocide, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2006, at A15 (Momocil Kryisnick, head of Bosnian Serb Parliament convicted 
of crimes against humanity, acquitted of genocide). 
 27. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004). 
 28. Schabas, supra note 24, at 1708, 1716. But compare David Nubon, Calling Genocide by Its 
Rightful Name, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006). 
 29. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro) (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.icjrwww/ipress.com/ 
ipress2007/summary.2007-2-bhv-20070226.html; Marlise Simons, Court Still Weighing Genocide 
Case from Milosevic Era, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, International, at 6. Charles Taylor, the deposed 
leader of Liberia, will soon be tried by the Sierra Leone Special Chamber for crimes against humanity, 
not genocide. Even in Rwanda, where the archetype genocide has occurred, there was disagreement 
whether the Tutsis qualified as a religious, ethnic, racial group. It was decided in one case that any 
“stable and permanent group” could qualify but this is by no means an accepted position among 
international law experts or jurists. Now, however, the Appeals Chamber has held that the fact that 
there was a genocide against the Tutsis in 1994 is judicially noticeable as a fact of common 
knowledge. Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(c), Decision on Prosecutor’s 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/13
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Now, you might well ask. So what? Is there any real problem so long 
as atrocities can be punished under some category of international crime? 
As I mentioned, genocide—the “crime of crimes” does carry the heaviest 
stigma in the popular and in the diplomatic world—remember the internal 
State Department ban against using the “G word” in the mid-nineties while 
the U.S. was still reticent to intervene in the Balkan war. And though none 
of the international tribunals have sentencing tariffs which put different 
ranges on the two crimes, in my time there was a feeling among at least 
some judges that genocide lay at the apex and deserved the highest level of 
sanction—indeed there was a notion among some that some space would 
be left at that top level for as yet untried genocidieres. Such factors may 
enter into the prosecutors’ charging calculus along with the accessibility of 
evidence, the differences in definitions and levels of proof between 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Crimes against humanity do have some additional proof burdens over 
war crimes, but in tribunal jurisprudence they are not particularly onerous. 
Although in the early years there was a difference in interpretation 
between the ICTY and the ICTR as to whether there had to be a 
discriminatory intent shown for all crimes against humanity—a legacy of 
Nuremberg—the ICTY and later the ICTR decided that discriminatory 
intent applied only to persecution not to the other listed crimes against 
humanity.30 For crimes against humanity the chapeau requirement that the 
charged acts be part of a “widespread or systematic attack on a civilian 
population” has been on the whole liberally interpreted to qualify a wide 
variety of acts of violence of different scopes that do not necessarily rise to 
the level of an armed conflict for this background predicate. For instance, 
the territory on which the attack is carried out need not be very large in 
order for it to be “widespread.” In one case the attack took place over an 
area of20 kilometers; in others, three municipalities, three prefectures or 
two communes sufficed. Even a single prison camp qualified.31 The Rome 
Statute defines a qualifying attack as “a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of [certain] acts against any civilian population 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organized policy to commit such 
attack” (Art. 7(2)). Granted, a loner can’t commit a crime against 
humanity all by himself as in genocide, without a wider campaign against 
civilians in the background. Under the Rome definition there has to be 
more than one victim, and the attack has to be organized, though the State 
 
 
Interlocutory Appeal Against Trial Chamber III Decision (Dec. 19, 2003). 
 30. GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 671 (2005). 
 31. WERLE, supra note 30, at 654–57. 
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itself need not be involved. The perpetrator must know that his own acts 
are part of this widespread or systematic attack though he need not have 
the same intent as the participants in the broader attack. In practice, 
however, the “systematic or widespread” chapeau of crimes against 
humanity presents no great obstacle to prosecution. Indeed it is often 
stipulated or proven by “expert” evidence or reference to transcripts or 
testimony in earlier cases.32 Under a recent Appeals Chamber case dealing 
with Rwanda, the existence of widespread and systematic attacks on 
civilians as well as an internal armed conflict were held to be “notorious 
facts not subject to reasonable debate” of which a Trial Chamber must take 
judicial notice.33 Where as in the Balkans or Sierra Leone there is an 
ongoing armed conflict at the time of the charged acts, international or 
internal, it is almost inevitably accompanied by a pattern of civilian abuse 
widely known enough throughout the region to qualify as “common 
knowledge.” In the prosecution of guards at the infamous Omarska prison 
camp, the ICTY trial court found that the specific atrocities charged 
involving abuse of prisoners were part of a systematic attack on the 
civilians who were imprisoned there and this “would have had to be 
known to all who worked in or regularly visited the camp.”34 
Persecution is perhaps the most widely charged crime against 
humanity. It does require that a discriminatory intent against a group be 
shown as motivating the forbidden actions but the protected groups are 
broader than those that qualify for genocide and the range of acts that may 
qualify for prosecution under the persecution umbrella is broader still, 
including any deprivation of a fundamental right. Exactly what must be 
shown for “persecution,” however, has had some rocky bumps along the 
interpretive route. In the Kupresic case, on which I sat, the Appeals 
Chamber reversed several convictions based on persecution because of a 
failure to identify the material facts underlying the charge of persecution 
in the indictment with any specificity and a subsequent weakness of 
eyewitness evidence at trial.35 There is also an active debate about the 
IRTC trial court’s ruling in the media case that hate speech by itself can 
amount to persecution as a crime against humanity.36 The Kupresic case 
warned that persecution should not be used as a “catch all charge,” but 
 
 
 32. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/lT, Trial Chamber I Judgment, ¶ 129 
(Nov. 2, 2001). 
 33. Prosecutor v. Karemera, supra note 29. 
 34. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 32, ¶ 129. 
 35. Prosecutor v. Kupresic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgment (Oct. 23, 2001). 
 36. Diane Orintlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 557 (2006). 
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unless carefully monitored, it does have that potential. As one leading 
ICTY prosecutor has said: “the Prosecution has used persecution as a kind 
of umbrella charge to cover ‘ethnic cleansing’ as no single crime really 
covers it.”37 
What seems to be happening on the ground in the ad hoc tribunals is 
that because the same acts can so often be charged as either war crimes or 
crimes against humanity, they are charged as both. Within the crimes 
against humanity category itself, the same acts may be charged both as 
stand-alone murders or exterminations or inhumane treatment and as 
persecution, using the underlying murders as the deprivation of rights 
required for persecution. Thus a single act or set of actions such as 
inhumane treatment or rape can form the basis for charges of war crimes, 
and several separate crimes against humanity. Indictments as a result often 
have dozens of counts based on a single fact situation.38 Tribunal 
jurisprudence, despite internal dissents, has settled on allowing cumulative 
charging and convictions for different crimes based on differences in their 
legal definitions rather than requiring any differences in their underlying 
facts. So long as both crimes have an independent element not found in the 
other they can support separate convictions. Thus murder and inhumane 
treatment can be charged as crimes against humanity and also as 
persecution (if the discriminatory intent is shown); persecution and 
genocide can be based on the same facts, so can genocide and 
extermination; beatings can be charged as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity; torture is a war crime, a crime against humanity and if 
discriminatory intent is shown also persecution.39 
Given all this, prosecutors have much discretion in what and in how 
many ways to charge underlying conduct. They can “send a message” by 
the charges, and it is my impression that over the years ICTY prosecutors 
have limited themselves less and less to charging war crimes only and 
more and more have charged a combination of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity or crimes against humanity alone. The charge of a crime 
 
 
 37. E-mail communication from David Tolbert, Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, to author 
(Aug. 10, 2006) (on file with author). 
 38. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 32, ¶¶ 751–64. A recent rule change allows the 
judge to order the prosecutor to limit the number of crimes that can be charged based on the same 
facts. Id. 
 39. See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, supra note 32, ¶¶ 212–39. Multiple convictions entered upon 
different statutory provisions but based on the same conduct are possible if each statutory provision 
has a materially distinct element not contained in the other. The elements in the chapeau as well as the 
underlying offense are taken into account in deciding if there are distinct elements. The duplication 
can be factored into the final sentence which is a unitary one for all convictions resulting from a single 
indictment. Id. 
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against humanity has a more serious “feel” about it and with the advent of 
plea bargaining can indeed leave room for bargaining down to a war crime 
if a plea appears likely. 
Prosecutorial strategies thus clearly impact the choice of charges. In 
many cases in the Bosnian conflict the proof necessary for different 
categories of crimes was much the same, or if it differed, additional 
evidence was readily accessible to prove the higher level one, and the 
prosecutors had great discretion which category to choose. My impression, 
as I said, is that over the years they relied on war crimes less and less 
(though this could be a result of charging more serious offenders) and 
crimes against humanity more and more. Does it matter? Crimes against 
humanity were conceived to fill the gap in international humanitarian law 
for cases where a State abused its own people—at Nuremberg as part of a 
war strategy, later even in peacetime. It can, however, also apply to crimes 
committed during war and against an enemy civilian population; its 
increasing use in that way does run the risk of diluting its currency as a 
deterrent or stigmata to be applied to those crimes all humanity has singled 
out for special treatment, and conversely its overuse poses a danger of 
overstigmatizing what would more reasonably be viewed as war crimes. 
One of my prosecutor friends raises another interesting nuance about 
the potential downsizing of crimes against humanity in Tribunal 
jurisprudence. He points out that the Appeals Chamber has, in several 
cases, treated the higher-ups in the crimes who did not dirty their hands 
but nonetheless knew about, acquiesced in, and affirmatively contributed 
to large-scale crimes against humanity or even genocide as “remote 
accessories to the crimes,” thus limiting their liability to aiding and 
abetting, rather than perpetrating the crimes. He calls this a “micro” 
approach which “relegates the concept of crimes against humanity to some 
kind of aggravation of individual murders or rapes rather than the massive 
crimes they are and . . . undermine[s] the importance of the concept [of 
crimes against humanity] in general.” The individual crimes committed by 
the men in the field became the focus not the acquiescing or contributing 
behavior of the generals who could have ended it all. It is an interesting 
observation on how practice can subtly mold theory and purpose. There is 
additionally something faintly troubling about using a crime against 
humanity charge as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations, abandoned in 
exchange for a plea or cooperation or as a means to accumulate 
convictions for a single act.40 
 
 
 40. E-mail communications, supra note 37. 
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In the end I have to ask if we have reached a point where definitional 
niceties, important as they are in any criminal prosecution, have obscured 
what should be clearer demarcation lines between war crimes and crimes 
against humanity on the one hand, and on the other hand have required 
truly horrendous crimes against certain groups of people to be “dumbed 
down” from genocide to crimes against humanity because they don’t fit 
the tight genocidal definitional perimeters for targeted groups and 
destructive intent. 
The answer to this dilemma may lie in more discrete use of the crimes 
against humanity tag by prosecutors or in greater guidance by the 
international law experts and judges as to the appropriate domain for 
crimes against humanity that will recapture its original conceptual role as a 
sanction for especially heinous atrocities committed by governments or 
organizations against collections of peoples, that transcend the kind of 
crimes that unfortunately characterize local war scenes. With respect to 
genocide, however, the opposite is true; genocide has taken on a life of its 
own in the popular mind; victims of almost all massacres feel cheated 
when a court or commission finds that their perpetrators have only 
committed a crime against humanity not a genocide. Eventually the 
popular will may have to be accommodated and some term found that will 
satisfy the understandable yearning for the ultimate condemnation of mass 
killings, regardless of the identity of their victims.  
To finish on the brighter side, however, whatever the charges, the 
threat of prosecution has become a vital factor in international politics. 
African heads of state have themselves asked the new ICC to investigate 
actions of armed militias in their countries so that the time-honored 
impunity of African leaders is in greater peril today than ever before. The 
willingness of international courts to take on these cases has in turn 
spurred national courts into greater action in internal corruption cases. 
According to the Washington Post, “despite the political flavor of many of 
the cases . . . analysts, legal experts and human rights activists say the 
court’s actions mark a new era in which African disputes increasingly are 
being resolved by judges rather than soldiers. . . . The politics of the rule 
of law is having positive consequences for the cause of justice.”41 
That is a good note to end on. 
 
 
 41. Craig Timberg, Impunity on Trial in Africa, WASH. POST, May 2, 2006, at A16. 
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